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Recovering the Moment 
by Kenton Engel 
Abstract 
What is a moment? While Heidegger considers the moment (Augenblick) hermeneutically in the first 
division of Being and Time¸ he abandons the thoroughly hermeneutic account in an ecstatic analysis 
of time in the second. In this paper, I explore the moment in the direction of hermeneutic temporality 
and finite comprehensibility. I begin by describing how Heidegger’s ecstatic analysis by its very nature 
forecloses the possibility of the average, everyday constitution of the moment. I then attempt a broader 
recovery of hermeneutic temporality, specifically instantiated in Gadamer’s temporality of the festival. 
In so doing, I hope to re-establish the Augenblick as the moment of finite comprehensibility. 
Introduction: The Beginning Moment 
What is a moment? The answer would seem obvious: 
A moment, like a second, or an hour, is a measurable 
period, instance or unit of time. But if a moment is a 
measurable period or instance of time, how long is it, 
precisely? A second is exactly 1/60th of a minute, a 
length determined by the periodicity of the radiation 
of a caesium-133 atom. A minute is 1/60th of an hour, 
of which there are 24 in a day, with the day itself 
determined by the rotation of celestial bodies. What is a 
moment’s objectively-determined span, then? Precisely 
what makes a moment a moment, in the first place, is 
that it lacks any objective measurement independent of 
human experience. But tying a moment’s non-duration 
to the subjectivity of an individual human is tantamount 
to saying that it has no such measure at all. What, then, 
is an immeasurable period? 
At least in the context of moments as they appear in 
human experience, I think the answer lies in following 
Heidegger and, on abandoning the narrow typology of 
“calendar time”, turning instead to a sense of time as 
a lived-in phenomenon. Heidegger’s solution for a 
phenomenological temporality, however, is an ecstatic 
analysis that plunges the human experience of time into 
a transcendental quandary. Missing from Heidegger’s 
account of time and temporality is an explanation for 
what it is like to experience the uncanny feeling where 
a moment discloses itself to us as a moment. What we 
require, therefore, is a hermeneutic exploration of the 
moment as it is experienced. By utilizing the practical 
and practice-oriented phenomenology of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, I attempt such an exploration in this paper. 
The purpose of this paper is to recover the average 
everyday, lived-in character of the moment. 
Method: Gadamer’s Phenomenology 
Ricoeur (1987) famously notes that the development of 
phenomenology is heretical. Indeed, the history of 
phenomenology is the history of deviations from 
Husserl’s original methodology, each adherent claiming 
to detail and overcome the various theoretical and 
methodological inconsistencies in Husserl’s original 
enterprise. Heidegger ostensibly overcomes Husserl’s 
erroneous subjectivizing; Sartre the isolation of the 
transcendental ego, placing the “I” into contact with 
others. As variability constitutes the historical trajectory 
of phenomenology, it seems profitable to attest my 
fealties now, at the outset, such that one need not read 
the philosophical tea leaves to determine their level of 
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agreeance with my methodology. 
 
In this paper, I follow a lineage of thinking that 
considers phenomenology’s prime directive to be 
delineating the necessary hermeneutic – that is, expressly 
interpretative – conditions of human meaningfulness 
and intelligibility. In this sense, Gadamer is, despite the 
consternation that often surrounds discussions as to 
whether his work is phenomenological, perhaps the most 
phenomenological phenomenologist of all. Despite being 
a student of both Husserl and (primarily) Heidegger, 
Gadamer abandons the methodological formalism of 
phenomenology in favour of a practical and practice-
oriented hermeneutical phenomenology of everyday 
dialogue. Although he presupposes and makes use of 
Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts such as Lebens-
welt and horizonality, he largely renounces methodolo-
gism in general. Gadamer’s phenomenology, according 
to Dostal (2002), “abjures the absolute, does not have a 
place for a transcendental ego, does not provide a treat-
ment of philosophical method (Methodenlehre) except 
indirectly, and does not work toward a final foundation 
(Letztbegrundung)” (p. 252). Gadamer instead frames 
phenomenology as a practical and reflective method – 
as something that shows up as a feature embedded in 
human experience, rather than a structure imposed on it. 
The generative and evocative power of this phenomeno-
logy derives from its textured portrayals of concrete 
human phenomena. The concern, here, is tilted towards 
the seemingly mundane and banal trivialities of every-
day human life, over and above philosophical questions 
concerning indubitable knowledge or the conditions of 
possibility of phenomenological understanding. 
 
It is precisely this approach that I attempt to emulate 
in this paper, intending to expose the heuristic worth 
inhering in the everyday experiences of the moment. 
In so doing, I adopt the general thrust of Gadamer’s 
phenomenological approach: one of privileging the 
pursuit of the mundane over the apodictic, while still 
making use of properly phenomenological tools and 




The human life is lived in moments: The moment you 
read this sentence; the moments immediately preceding 
and following it; the moment of elation in a congratu-
latory hug, or the moment of grief in a deep loss. In 
fact, our most basic reflections occur in the seeming 
discreteness of moments. Try to recall a vivid personal 
experience. What emerges in your recollection? The 
visual milieu, the swirling aromas, the emotional current 
running through your body. What is almost certainly 
missing – unless time itself is the object of your 
recollection – is a distinct sense of time’s advancement. 
Perhaps a feeling toward time itself exists in your 
memory (for instance, that it was slow, or fast), but 
gaining purchase on its transitive procession is elusive. 
Time in our memories seeps and congeals, and so the 
prismatic clarity of our memories occurs against the 
background of a temporal stasis. Or, at least, time 
presents in our memories with an amorphousness at 
odds with the portrait of time as a transitive phenomenon 
provided above. While we may conceptualize moments 
as separate and distinct manifestations of an objective 
time, our reflections suggest that they are interminably 
linked. Or perhaps are not separable to begin with? 
 
The moment is fascinating because it is simultaneously 
nebulous and determinate: it is a literal no-thing, and yet 
it slips into and shapes our experiences and the language 
we use to describe them. For example, we do not describe 
a deep and felt sense of connection with another person 
as “having a second”. Nor do we describe becoming 
“lost in the hour”, or “needing fifteen seconds to 
myself”. Even in instances where we use ostensibly 
specific measures of time to describe an experience, we 
seem to gesture to a psychological, rather than temporal, 
phenomenon: when we “need a second”, we really 
require a break or an emotional wind-down. The time 
involved in this break is not pre-determined (as a 
second is) and is only relevant to the extent that it 
positively shifts our disposition. The vernacular betrays 
the moment’s pride of place, suggesting that it enjoys 
an experiential privilege in our lives that strict measures 
of time do not. The etymology of the moment, perhaps, 
also speaks of this preference: moment is the Latin 
root of momentum, that which carries something forward 
– its essential impetus or impulse. In Medieval philo-
sophy, moment is synonymous with the sine qua non, 
the condition without which something cannot be. 
What would a human life be without moments? Is a 
human life comprehensible without them? 
 
Recognizing that the moment is essential to human 
experience is a partial victory, however. The challenge 
remains to explicate the moment’s phenomenology in 
a way that renders it conceptually useful. To that end, 
we return to the question that opens this paper: what 
is a moment? As a first step along the path, might we 
consider that the moment is not – at least in the 
commonly understood (and so, scientific) sense – 
temporal? Perhaps the moment is rather a signpost to 
something else; a signification that points to the psycho-
logically relevant function of time, rather than time or 
temporality itself. Specifically, the moment may be 
the mechanism for time’s most indelible feature: making 
the world intelligible for us. Here, the moment ceases 
to be the sharp demarcation of an objective time and 
instead emerges as a sense in which humans are made 
aware of their ability for sense. 
 
Heidegger, of course, devotes a substantial portion of 
Being and Time to discussing something like the moment 
as it is described here. I will want to say, however, 
that Heidegger’s commitment to an ecstatic temporality 
compels him to view the moment as liminal. In his 
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pursuit of a foundational ontology conditioned on the 
ek-stasis of the Augenblick (Heidegger’s term for the 
moment, and the term I will use to differentiate it 
from the moment considered here), Heidegger destroys 
what I think is the deeper hermeneutic and experiential 
relevance of the moment. Given the potential contami-
nation between Heidegger’s Augenblick and the moment 
described here, it is worth briefly considering how 
Heidegger conceives of the former. Describing the 
ways in which the moment in this paper differs from 
Heidegger’s Augenblick will also advance our answer as 
to what, precisely, a moment is. 
 
Der Augenblick and the Moment 
 
Prior to the shifting of his focus in the post-war period, 
time and temporality figure prominently in Heidegger’s 
work. Specifically, Heidegger militates against the 
“ordinary” or “vulgar” conception of time as an eternal 
procession, a thing caught up in “dating”, or “calendrical 
time-reckoning” (1927/2010, p. 412). He notes, for 
example, that “[time is not the] … vulgar … succession 
of constantly ‘present’ [‘vorhanden’] nows that pass 
away and arrive at the same time” (p. 412). Instead, time 
for Heidegger is an expressly hermeneutic enterprise; 
that is, time’s function is to mean for us. By resisting 
the entitative characterization of vulgar time as a 
physico-mathematical property, delineable into discrete 
and successive units, we instead consider time as a sense 
that conglomerates these units into a unified field of 
experience, that is, into temporality. Temporality is here 
explicitly thematic: Temporalität makes timeliness (Zeit-
lichkeit), an ontic determination of Dasein, appropriately 
ontological as “the condition of possibility for the 
understanding of being and of ontology as such” (1967/ 
1998, p. 228). For Heidegger, time is thus not occurrent, 
but operant: it “temporalizes” (1925/1992, p. 410). 
 
The “vulgar” or “ordinary” conception of time that 
temporality temporalizes is a problem for phenomeno-
logy, according to Heidegger, because it precludes the 
effectively interpretative relationship between time 
and the human Dasein in its infinity. Our very finite 
confrontation with time is precisely what designates us 
as human, as finitude constellates the manifold possi-
bilities that fashion a human life as distinctly human. 
All our temporal engagements distinguish themselves as 
such because they are backgrounded by the possibility 
of our non-existence; a notion we instantiate in a broad 
range of colloquialisms, each of which captures the 
impermanence of a human life (“here today, gone 
tomorrow”, “time is money”, “times flies”, “no time like 
the present”, and so on). And so, an eternal conception 
of time – considering time as a material infinity – is 
“meaningless” (1925/1992, p. 21) because temporality 
functions first and most of all for Dasein: 
 
... time temporalizes itself only as long as there 
are human beings. There is no time in which 
there were no human beings, not because there 
are human beings from all eternity and for all 
eternity, but because time is not eternity, and 
time always temporalizes itself only at one time, 
as human, historical Dasein. (1953/2000, p. 89) 
 
Insofar as I see the human-historical – and so, decidedly 
hermeneutic – function of time, I also see myself as the 
for-the-sake-of-which that time operates. In this sketch 
of time, if there is “no Dasein” there is “no time” 
(Blattner, 2007, p. 12). 
 
So far, Heidegger’s portrait of time aims in the general 
direction we are pursuing: the moment as a descriptor 
of time, or something that reveals time’s functions to 
and for us. Unfortunately, Heidegger’s hermeneutical 
analysis of temporality serves an ontological master. To 
the extent that Heidegger recognizes the essentially 
hermeneutic constitution of everyday time, he does so 
only to demonstrate how that everyday time is and must 
be transcended in what he deems authentic temporality. 
Heidegger begins cutting against the concept of time 
as a hermeneutic distillation in §65 of Being and Time 
(1927/2010). It is here that he introduces Augenblick 
as the literal moment-in-time that allows us to transcend 
our own history and view the authentic and primordial 
time that is temporality’s ontological ground. 
 
Heidegger’s pivot from hermeneutics to an ecstatic 
thesis begins with the primacy Heidegger affords to 
the not-yet (being-ahead-of-itself) in temporality. The 
future is “the primary phenomenon of ... authentic 
temporality” (1927/2010, p. 314) because it is where one 
travels to grasp one’s death as “that possibility which 
is one’s ownmost” (p. 294). Even though the Heraclitean 
nature of death – when it is present, we are not; and 
when we are present, it is not – prevents us from ever 
directly experiencing death, we can recognize death’s 
fundamental operation: to individualize and totalize us. 
Death is not a physiological process, in this sense, but 
the termination of the manifold of possibilities whose 
opening characterizes one’s life. Hence, if we confront 
the “possibility of the impossibility of any existence 
at all” (p. 307), we produce the “resolute existentiell 
understanding of nullity” (p. 315) as the possibility 
that is most authentically ours. 
 
Enter the Augenblick. In Heidegger’s futurally-oriented 
temporal schema, the Augenblick is the ek-stasis 
(ἔκστασις, “to stand outside oneself”) in which we step 
outside of ourselves as hermeneutically-constituted by 
the finite, lived-in world of everyday things and render 
ourselves visible – here Heidegger’s perceptual metaphor 
derives from Kierkegaard’s moment-of-insight – on 
time’s (now) infinitely transcendental horizon. “In 
resoluteness,” Heidegger says, 
 
the present is not only brought back from its 
dispersion in what is taken care of closest at 
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hand, but is held in the future and having-been. 
We call the present that is held in authentic 
temporality, and is thus authentic, the Moment 
[Augenblick]. (1927/2010, p. 338) 
 
Notice the operative term: “brought back.” Where was 
the present? Bound up in the finite sense of meaning 
as taking care of everyday things, that is, “ensnared in 
our everydayness” (Krell, 2015, loc. 570-571). Where is 
it brought to? The transcendental a priori temporality 
of the future. 
 
According to Heidegger, the cost of an “authentic 
resolute” grasp of our ownmost possibility (our own 
finality, a phenomenological death) is retroactively 
destroying the hermeneutic constitution of time as the 
finite horizon of involvement in everyday things. The 
reality of an everyday time, acknowledged in our every-
day involvements in the world, is here relinquished by 
virtue of the more originary time: a temporal river, 
flowing beneath our quotidian time engagements, and 
reached in the “rupture” (Krell, 1991, loc. 1171) of the 
Augenblick. For Heidegger, the moment’s sole purpose 
is initiating the transcendence of everyday time into 
the supposed primordiality (a priori temporality) that 
infrastructures it. 
 
I reject this view of the Augenblick for three reasons. 
The first reason is that this view of the moment is 
effectively incomprehensible. How does the dismissed, 
finite, inauthentic “now” in which we live our lives 
spit out the authentic, infinite temporality whose unity 
retroactively transforms the inauthentic moment to 
present us with that supposedly a priori authenticity? In 
other words: how can a fundamentally finite experience 
of time – as any human experience of time must 
necessarily be – itself be a priori infinite? Derrida 
launches a critique in this vein in “Ousia and Grammé”, 
noting that 
 
... perhaps there is no “vulgar concept of time”. 
The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs 
to metaphysics, and it names the domination of 
presence … that an other concept of time cannot 
be opposed to it, since time in general belongs 
to metaphysical conceptuality. In attempting to 
produce this other concept, one rapidly would 
come to see that it is constructed out of other 
metaphysical or ontotheological predicates. 
(1972/1982, p. 63) 
 
Although I diverge from Derrida in the possible 
conceptions of time, he is correct in asserting that 
Heidegger inevitably and implicitly turns a “meta-
physical predicate” to rescue time from what he feels is 
its dissipation in instrumentality. (Specifically, Heidegger 
acquiesces to the Kantian schematism of a transcendental 
temporality.) 
The second reason is that Heidegger’s ecstatic concep-
tion of the moment – as can be said for his ecstatic 
analysis of temporality – leaves no room for the other. 
As Sartre notes in the section on “The Existence of 
Others” in Being and Nothingness, Heidegger’s militant 
obsession with Dasein’s self-resolution renders both the 
existence and the alterity of the other inconceivable 
(1943/1984, p. 334). Heidegger’s Dasein – even with 
Mitsein (being-with) as one of its characteristic modes – 
is indeed a solitary figure. The moral call to authenticity 
and resoluteness, after all, is to grasp the ultimate 
“mineness” of authentic temporality in the Augenblick. 
If Heidegger’s position is that temporality functions 
first and most of all for me, insofar as I see this function, 
I also conceal (verborgen) all the instances in which 
moments are not mine alone. And time, for Heidegger, 
is of course not automatically authentic, and therefore 
not automatically ours: it must become ours by virtue of 
active efforts we make toward that end. If we must heed 
the magnetic obligations that Dasein supposedly makes 
on its world to become authentic, then we foreclose 
the possibility of – or render automatically inauthentic, 
and therefore less than – moments or experiences which 
involve others. This fact hardly corresponds with our 
everyday experience, where others are always either 
directly involved or indirectly felt in their absence. 
 
The third reason is that Heidegger’s ecstatic misadven-
ture robs from the moment its experiential relevance. 
In pursuing a temporal ground for his fundamental 
ontology, Heidegger leaves us bereft of a phenomeno-
logy of what it is like to live through a moment and 
what the philosophical/phenomenological import of that 
experience might be. Here Heidegger’s perspicacity and 
technical wizardry is his fatal flaw: rather than submit 
his temporality to the indignity of existing within the 
history of metaphysics, Heidegger pushes time to the 
synthetic precipice. In his ecstatic portrait, we somehow 
manifest our sense of time from a non-existent, and 
unaccounted for, exteriority in the diachronic of pure 
time. Heidegger’s temporality effectively disassembles 
time’s appearance in our everyday dealings and reas-
sembles it in an ostensibly more ancient transcendental 
diachrony. In so doing, Heidegger relentlessly denies 
the felt sense of time or temporality’s experience. 
Heidegger gives no quarter for the hermeneutic moment 
in his ecstatic analysis, because Heidegger gives no 
quarter for a grounded, quotidian experience of time in 
his analysis. Summing up this same issue in his own 
exegesis of the Augenblick, Krell calls for a recovery of 
the Augenblick in the “direction of everydayness” (2015, 
loc. 1181): 
 
[Heidegger’s] reference to the Augenblick, while 
crucial to the issue of the finitude of Dasein, 
does not serve to illuminate the temporal cha-
racter of the “moment”. It is perhaps [here] that 
we witness the ultimate failure – actually the 
default – of the analysis of ecstatic temporality. 
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It may be a task for contemporary thinking to 
recover that analysis, to pursue it in the direc-
tions of both everydayness and finite existence. 
For the metabolism of time confronts Dasein in 
all its quotidian involvements, all the while it is 
under way to something insurmountable. 
 
In the following section, I attempt that recovery by 
expanding on Gadamer’s (admittedly limited) thoughts 
on temporality. 
 
Recovering the Moment 
 
In an important way, the moment stresses the relation-
ship between language and lived experience. When 
describing sharing or having a moment with another, 
for example, we tend to be tempted to use words like 
reciprocity or connection to connote the moment’s rough 
contours. But I suspect that these are insufficiently 
sharp linguistic tools to capture what occurs when we 
have a moment, share a moment, become lost in the 
moment, and so on. These instances of the moment 
seem not to be, paradoxically, mere expressions or 
forms of connectedness. The term connect implies an 
intentional severance, regardless of how and to what 
degree that severance is overcome; and acknowledging 
this severance leads us on the path that Heidegger 
took and that we rejected above. As we now know, 
Heidegger bridges this disconnection by developing 
an ecstatic analysis of temporality that re-unifies the 
severed parts of time into a transcendental a priori. 
 
To both describe a moment and conserve its everyday 
presentation, we require a description of the moment 
that completes, rather than abdicates, the hermeneutic 
analysis of time-as-meaning that Heidegger begins in 
the first division of Being and Time. Despite Gadamer’s 
steadfast ambivalence regarding the issue of time and 
temporality, there is a section in Truth and Method (1960/ 
1991), “The Temporality of the Aesthetic”, that, perhaps, 
germinates such a properly hermeneutic reorientation 
of the moment. In this section, Gadamer affects what 
I consider a profound break from Heidegger’s ecstatic 
temporality, insofar as the former corresponds with 
the genuine being (ούσία) of temporality to the presence 
(παρουσία) of the spectator who observes being’s event 
in, and only in, the present. As the designated observer, 
the theoros (θεωρός) is sent either as a functionary of 
the city-state to the Panhellenic games, or alternatively 
to the oracle at Delphi to engage in “sacred spectating” 
and thus to glean “broader perspective” and transmit 
this knowledge back to the city (Nightingale, 2004, p. 
35). In the sacralised observance of religious theoria 
(θεωρία) as, for example, in the Mysteries, Plato sees 
the contemplative model that he will later formalize in 
the philosophy of the Phaedrus. The theoros gazes past 
earthly contingency to recognize the Form of Being, 
and, so initiated, travels back to the body incarnate to 
recollect these forms and “contemplate them through 
the practice of philosophy” (Nightingale, 2004, p. 87). 
As Nightingale notes, the contemplative theoria is thus 
a form of temporal recursion, or repetition: once initiated 
into the Forms, the practising philosopher “undergoes 
an abiding and continuous initiation in the present”. 
 
In this recurring-present of the religious theoria Gadamer 
recognizes the “highly puzzling temporal structure” 
(1960/1991, p. 126) of the ritualistically repeated festival: 
the ritual literally re-presents the original incarnation 
of the salvific event, not in a mere mimesis, but in its 
reality. In continuous or indefinite re-present-ation – 
the process (-ātiō) of making the present new again (-re) 
– the temporality of the festival casts off the “usual 
experience of temporal succession” as between “present, 
memory, and expectation” (p. 126) in a radical present-
ness. The contemplative theoria thus unfolds, in each 
instance of its repetition, the uninhibited re-creation of 
a “present time sui generis” (p. 127). Hence the theoric 
gaze circumvents the intentional severance of an ecstatic 
analysis of temporality with the perpetual recursion of 
the present back into itself. Gadamer critically defines 
the continuity of this perpetual present as not epiphanic 
(epipháneia, ἐπιφάνεια) and therefore not ecstatic. The 
theoric event does not burst forth ecstatically into mere 
historical projection to show (epi-phaneia, “to make 
show”) “some other future or reality behind it” (p. 129) 
because the spectator is already “purely present to what 
is truly real”. The present-ness of the event is thus taken 
as exhibiting an “autonomous circle of meaning” (p. 
129): the spectator’s sense of temporality does not need 
a transcendental analytic to re-connect the present to an 
original temporality, because she is really there, in the 
absolute sense of the present and nous. Gadamer 
expresses the total hermeneutic envelopment of theoria 
in presence by subtly modulating Heidegger’s famous 
neologism: the spectator is a “being there present 
(Dabeisein)”, an engrossed passivity who is not, as in 
Heidegger’s formulation of Dasein, merely “being along- 
side” in presence, but whose very being is determined 
by it (p. 129). 
 
Gadamer’s formulation can be seen as more than merely 
emphasizing the locative case over the pronomial. 
Heidegger’s turn to an ecstatic, transcendental analytic 
of time is, in Gadamer’s theoria, circumvented in appeal 
to the absorption of spectation in the event of being 
(purely present, παρουσῐ́α, to what is really real). Unlike 
Heidegger, Gadamer does not see the purely present 
moment as needing transcendence, for the festival’s 
literal re-present-ation recurs what was already taken as 
real. Not only is the repetition taken as real, but in its pure 
difference, the re-presentation, in “being only becoming 
and return”, lodges a “radical sense” of temporality: 
 
Thus its own original essence is to always be 
something different (even if celebrated in the 
exact same way). An entity that exists only by 
always being something different is temporal 
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in a more radical sense than everything that 
belongs to history. (1960/1991, p. 126) 
 
The moment itself, even though not an entity, displays 
exactly this incessant difference in its endless becoming 
itself. The seeming lack of temporal progression that we 
established in our recollections above, this temporal 
amorphousness, derives from the moment’s perpetual 
recursion: the moment seems both to be in time and to 
lack it, because its constant re-generation expresses the 
present in its purest form. The moment thus erases the 
“usual experience of temporal succession of … present, 
memory, and expectation” (p. 126) and homologizes the 
very ecstasies whose transcendence Heidegger demands. 
In its place, the moment exists only in the instantiated 
now-ness of re-presentation. 
 
At this juncture, I want to note that, while in “The 
Temporality of the Aesthetic” Gadamer is speaking about 
the unique temporality of the festival, I think he provides 
a pathway to connect theoretical contemplation and our 
everyday immersion in time. Approximately halfway 
through the section, Gadamer notes the total passivity 
of theoros: “Theoria is … not something active but 
passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in and 
carried away by what one sees” (1960/1991, p. 127). 
The reference to pathos is crucial, for it re-collects the 
primitive dimension of θεωρῐ́α in the light of θέα (théā, 
“sight”), as in, before the contemplative transformation, 
how the θεωρός sees the oracle in the way we see 
someone about a matter of concern to us and are 
“carried away” in that concern. In the original form of 
θεωρῐ́α, sacral spectating, the theoros thus heeds the call 
of pathos not, in the context of the pure contemplātiō 
which θεωρῐ́α later becomes, but rather in the sense of 
pathos’s root verb páskhō (πασχω), “to undergo an 
authentic experience”. Here Gadamer recalls something 
like Kierkegaard’s existential pathos: 
 
… pathos is not a matter of words, but of 
permitting this conception to transform the 
entire existence of the individual. Aesthetic 
pathos expresses itself in words, and may in 
truth indicate that the individual leaves his real 
self in order to lose himself in the Idea; while 
existential pathos is present whenever the Idea 
is brought in relation with the existence of the 
individual so as to transform it. (Kierkegaard, 
1846/1971, p. 347) 
 
The theoros answers the call of existential transforma-
tion (pathos) authentically, and, in so doing, really 
“transform[s]” his entire existence in being “wholly with 
something else” (Gadamer, 1960/1991, p. 127). The 
spectator thus transforms into one who has “no other 
distinction or function than to be there” (p. 127, 
emphasis added) and one who fades seamlessly into 
experience. The pathetic theoria is here an absorption, in 
totum, where the immediacy of the moment supersedes 
the seeming remoteness of time in the fusion of self-
forgetting. The moment’s effortless transmission of 
meaning occurs not in the laboured sterility of specu-
lative contemplation, not as the ego’s “subjective self-
determination”, but rather in that, in “attending” to 
something, one involuntarily gives “oneself in self-
forgetfulness” (p. 128). 
 
In our everyday directedness toward the moments in 
our lives, do we not always and already find ourselves 
given over to this kind of self-forgetting and hence also 
given over to this kind of re-presentative temporality? 
We do not stand guard over our everyday ties – 
including, most principally, the ties to our own lives – 
guiding them from start to completion like a teleolo-
gical parabola; we effortlessly “know our way around” 
(Sichverstehen) (Gadamer, 1960/1991, p. 261) time by 
virtue of “observing” (theáomai, “I observe”) time’s 
reference to our common-sense world. In this way, the 
hermeneutic of facticity in which we are all involuntarily 
involved, in its binding to the moment, eliminates the 
need to ecstatically transcend an everyday time to grasp 
time’s reality. I take Gadamer to mean something like 
this when he claims that the “reality of time” emerges 
 
with the historical sense, which is strictly 
speaking the awareness of epochs, of one’s own 
epoch and, in an even more basic way, of the 
‘pastness’ of an epoch: a stopping place in the 
constant flow of time, the establishment of a 
‘block of time’ consisting of the simultaneous 
or contemporaneous. (1977/1986, p. 43) 
 
To be aware of the “pastness” of one’s epoch is to be 
aware of the accumulation of moments in an articulated 
unity of one’s personal history (Mootz & Taylor, 2011, 
p. 127). A human life, as we have already noted, is 
lived in, through, and marked out by, moments: the 
moment you learned to ride a bike, or the moment of 
your first kiss, or the moment your first child was born. 
Time’s infinity self-congeals into historical moments 
that constitute our understanding of ourselves as embed-
ded within our authentic experience (πασχω) of them. 
Our most basic association with time is not awareness 
of its physico-mathematical properties – its duration, 
its continuity, its direction – but rather its seemingly 
static deposition in individual moments that we use to 
mark out its graduation. 
 
Our average everydayness, for Gadamer, is embedded 
in moments as they are perpetually established on the 
horizon of what he calls our “contemporaneity” with an 
event: 
 
Contemporaneity ... means that in its presenta-
tion this particular thing that presents itself to us 
achieves full presence, however remote its origin 
may be … . It consists in holding on to the thing 
in such a way that it becomes “contemporaneous”, 
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which is to say ... that all mediation is superseded 
in total presence. (1960/1991, p. 129) 
 
In our recognition of ourselves in the moment, we 
achieve “full presence” insofar as the moment’s self-
re-present-ation, like the temporality of the festival, 
brings “together two moments that are not concurrent, 
namely one’s present” (p. 129) and the other objective 
time instances that are re-presented in our experience. 
In perpetually establishing the contemporaneous in our 
experience, in other words, the moment “constitutes 
the essence of ‘being present’” (p. 129). In the moment, 
all mediation between the disparate nodules of time that 
concern Heidegger are superseded in the total presence 
of the pathic immersion of the experiencer in the 
present-now. 
 
Even though the trace or whisper of both past and future 
conspire to imbue the moment with its irrevocable 
continuity, the present-now is the meeting place for 
lived time in the “contemporaneous”. Our automatic, 
involuntary, habitual establishment and recognition of 
meaning in the contemporaneous is what congregates 
all the seemingly disparate elements of the world into 
the nexus of meaningfulness – that is, into the moment. 
A hermeneutical conception of the moment thus allows 
the phenomenon of meaning to disclose itself. In this 
disclosure, the moment is neither a container in which 
time is measured in terms of the rate of change occur-
ring between things, nor the instance of rupture. The 
moment, rather, is the practical instant in which one 
might undertake a phenomenology of time as it turns up 
in its most quotidian form. 
 
Conclusion: The Last Moment 
 
In an expressly hermeneutic rendition, the moment does 
not treat the en-worlded, en-vironed, historically-
existing person as a nuisance to be overcome and 
replaced. Instead, the moment is a framework for the 
presentation of life in all its pre-given untidiness – 
one in which the “uniqueness, finitude, and historicity 
[of] human Dasein [is] recognized not as an instance 
of an eidos, but rather as itself the most real factor of 
all” (Gadamer, 1963/2008, p. 135). A moment is a 
snapshot of a human life that seeks to preserve the 
irrefutable complexities of the human existence from the 
destruction of ecstatic temporality. Whereas Heidegger 
shuns the contemporaneous as the vestige of an 
inauthentic time, we understand that the perpetual 
recursion and repetition of the present moment is already 
a validity for us in each interpretative, dialogical or 
meaningful circumstance. 
 
And indeed, our most essential relationship to time – the 
crystallization of moments – unveils our hermeneutical 
wedding to the world. Moments disclose that our 
complexion is one of impose, of trespass, of infringe-
ment: we cannot unilaterally direct our sense out there 
to the world, but must accept the creep of the world into 
us and anoint that creep as constitutive. In our moment-
ality, we simultaneously experience the contents of 
the lifeworld and the capacity (being-present-there, in 
the nexus of meaning) that underwrites the way in which 
that lifeworld appears to us as already interpretable. The 
moment is a kind of recognition: a recognition of the 
singular importance of the human presence to imprint 
meaning onto an otherwise meaningless world. 
 
Such a conception links not only with the language we 
use to describe moments (having, needing, sharing, 
holding moments) but also the common-sense way these 
moments appear in the volume of our experience. Think 
again of the moment you recalled earlier: what stands 
out is a lightning flash of awareness, the intransigent, 
unignorable quality of your being there, and there’s 
intransigent, unignorable quality as being already replete 
with meaning. Note the effortless, involuntary reception 
of meaning in this moment; and, more importantly, how 
the reception of that meaning itself is available as an 
element of phenomenological investigation. Indeed, the 
moment becomes that moment for us – the one we have, 
need, share, lose ourselves in, live in, consume – 
because we subconsciously recognize that the moment 
reveals us as sensible creatures capable of having it. 
Recall your preferred moment again; now try to imagine 
it without the overwhelming transmission of meaning 
that inheres in it. That moment, like the more literal 
seconds of which your life is constituted, fades into 
obscurity. 
 
As we make sense of the world, we are reciprocally 
sense-made – that is, we are shaped and constituted 
by our ability to encounter an always and already 
interpretable world. The world is meaningful for us 
precisely and only because we are in it; and we are 
meaningful precisely and only because the world is in 
us. The moment is nothing more than the site on which 
the meaning-making complementarity of our human life 
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